Knowledge Creates Markets: The Influence of Entrepreneurial Support and Patent Rights on Academic Entrepreneurship by Czarnitzki, Dirk et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
European Economic Review
European Economic Review 86 (2016) 131–146http://d
0014-29
n Corrjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eerKnowledge Creates Markets: The inﬂuence of entrepreneurial
support and patent rights on academic entrepreneurship
Dirk Czarnitzki a,b, Thorsten Doherr b,c, Katrin Hussinger a,b,c, Paula Schliessler a,b,
Andrew A. Toole b,d,n
a KU Leuven, Dept. of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven, Belgium
b Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany
c University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
d US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, Washington D.C., United Statesa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 8 April 2015
Received in revised form
11 April 2016
Accepted 26 April 2016
Available online 28 April 2016
JEL classiﬁcation:
O34
O38
Keywords:
Intellectual property
Patents
Technology transfer
Policy evaluationx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.010
21/Published by Elsevier B.V.
esponding author at: US Patent and Tradema b s t r a c t
We use an exogenous change in German Federal law to examine how entrepreneurial
support and the ownership of patent rights inﬂuence academic entrepreneurship. In 2002,
the German Federal Government enacted a major reform called Knowledge Creates
Markets that set up new infrastructure to facilitate university-industry technology
transfer and shifted the ownership of patent rights from university researchers to their
universities. Based on a novel researcher-level panel database that includes a control
group not affected by the policy change, we ﬁnd no evidence that the new infrastructure
resulted in an increase in start-up companies by university researchers. The shift in patent
rights may have strengthened the relationship between patents on university-discovered
inventions and university start-ups; however, it substantially decreased the volume of
patents with the largest decrease taking place in faculty-ﬁrm patenting relationships.
Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Based on the belief that academic research is an important driver of economic growth and the perception that academic
institutions should have an entrepreneurial mission beyond teaching and research, policymakers are increasingly interested
in stimulating entrepreneurial behaviors among academic researchers. The idea is to change the incentives researchers face
so that entrepreneurial choices are more attractive. Numerous policy levers are available including tax policies, employment
policies, subsidies, entrepreneurial education, and intellectual property (IP) policies.
In the area of IP policies, the United States has become the de facto leader. In 1980, the Bayh–Dole Act facilitated
institutional ownership of inventions discovered by researchers who were supported by federal funds. Many observers
credit the Bayh–Dole Act with spurring university patenting and licensing that, in turn, stimulated innovation and entre-
preneurship (The Economist, 2002; OECD, 2003; Stevens, 2004). With this success, the Bayh–Dole Act has become a model
of university IP policy that is being debated and emulated in many countries around the world including Germany, Den-
mark, Japan, China, and others (OECD, 2003; Mowery and Sampat, 2005; So et al., 2008).ark Ofﬁce, Washington D.C., United States.
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companies? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has not received much attention in either the theoretical or empirical lit-
eratures. From a theoretical point of view, Damsgaard and Thursby (2013) examined the mode and success of commer-
cialization under an individual ownership system (i.e. the academic inventor keeps the patent rights) and a university
ownership system. In a number of cases, their model shows less faculty entrepreneurship (i.e. fewer faculty start-ups) under
university ownership. Using survey and case study evidence, Litan et al. (2007) and Kenney and Patton (2009) argued that
conﬂicting objectives and excessive bureaucracy make university ownership ineffective and suggest an individual owner-
ship system may be superior. In a follow-on study looking at technology-based university spin-offs, Kenney and Patton
(2011) found suggestive evidence that an individual ownership system is more efﬁcient for generating spin-offs.1
In this paper, we use an exogenous change in German Federal law to examine how entrepreneurial support and the
ownership of patent rights inﬂuence academic entrepreneurship.2 The new German policy strengthened the institutional
and ﬁnancial support for academic start-ups and fundamentally changed who owns the patent rights to university-
discovered inventions. Prior to 2002, university professors and researchers had exclusive intellectual property rights to their
inventions. This “Professor's Privilege” allowed university researchers to decide whether or not to patent and how to
commercialize their discoveries. After 2002, universities were granted the intellectual property rights to all inventions made
by their employees and this shifted the decision to patent from the researchers to the universities.
Based on a novel researcher-level panel database that includes a control group not affected by the IP policy change, we
ﬁnd no evidence that the new infrastructure resulted in an increase in start-up companies by university researchers. The
shift of patent rights to the universities not only changed the ownership distribution, but also impacted the volume of
patents on university-discovered inventions. The policy reform may have strengthened the relationship between patents on
university-discovered inventions and university start-ups (i.e. increased the marginal impact of university-owned patents
on university start-ups); however, it substantially decreased the volume of patents with the largest decrease taking place in
faculty-ﬁrm patenting relationships. By displacing so many faculty-ﬁrm relationships, our evidence suggests the policy
reform probably decreased overall university technology transfer.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section reviews the German policy reform, develops our conceptual
background using the literature and states the hypotheses to be tested. The third section describes the empirical identiﬁ-
cation strategy and introduces the data. Section 4 discusses the econometric results and the ﬁfth section concludes.2. Background and Hypotheses
In 2002, the German Federal Government introduced a major reform called Knowledge Creates Markets to stimulate
technology transfer from universities and other public research organizations to private industry for innovation and eco-
nomic growth. The program was largely a reaction to the “European paradox” (European Commission, 1995). At that time,
policymakers believed that Germany had one of the world's leading scientiﬁc research enterprises, but was lagging the
United States in terms of technology transfer and commercialization. The new program addressed four broad areas of
science-industry interactions including the processes and guidelines governing knowledge transfer, science-based new
ﬁrms, collaboration, and the exploitation of scientiﬁc knowledge in the private sector.
One part of the Knowledge Creates Markets reform created new institutions with new ﬁnancing to facilitate the
movement of university research to the private sector. Unlike most of Germany's public research organizations (PROs),3
German universities had little experience undertaking technology transfer activities, and only a few universities maintained
professionally managed technology transfer ofﬁces (TTOs) (Schmoch et al., 2000). The government established regional
patent valorization agencies (PVAs) that were supported with a budget of 46.2 million EURO (Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002).
Universities were free to choose whether to use the PVAs’ services or not. To date, 29 PVAs serve different regional uni-
versity networks and employ experts specialized in these universities’ research areas. The PVAs support the entire process
from screening inventions, ﬁnding industry partners, and determining fruitful commercialization paths, including the for-
mation of faculty start-up companies.
While the PVAs were intended to ﬁll a void in the institutional structure supporting commercialization of university
research, the reform also called for the expansion of Federal subsidies to university-speciﬁc TTOs. Among other initiatives,
the legislation included vocational training for university and PRO administrative staff on intellectual property and1 In a recent working paper, Astebro et al. (2016) compare entrepreneurship between the Bayh–Dole system in the U.S. and Sweden's faculty own-
ership system. Their analysis ﬁnds that Swedish academics are twice as likely to enter entrepreneurship, but average earnings deteriorate for academic
entrepreneurs in both countries after founding a new company.
2 Academic entrepreneurship is deﬁned as the formation of a new company in which the university researcher is part of the founding team. This
includes all university researcher start-ups – those that license university technologies and those that do not license (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2007; Kenney
and Patton, 2011; Czarnitzki et al., 2015).
3 In addition to universities, Germany's research enterprise includes other public research institutions that have many branches in a variety of different
scientiﬁc disciplines. For instance, the Fraunhofer Society has 59 institutes in Germany with about 17,000 employees, the Max Planck Society has 76
institutes with about 12,000 employees. The Leibniz Association employs 16,100 people in 86 research centers. The Helmholtz Association has about
30,000 employees in 16 research centers.
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fees), and subsidies for early stage entrepreneurial activity such as business plan development.
The idea that more support services through the PVAs and subsidies to university TTOs could stimulate more technology
transfer and academic entrepreneurship ﬁnds mixed support in the scholarly literature. One strand of the literature
investigates how the presence of a TTO, its resources and its capabilities inﬂuence technology transfer indicators such as
licenses and spin-off companies. For instance, Siegel et al. (2003) found that the number of TTO staff was positively asso-
ciated with the number of licensing agreements based on a sample of US universities. For university spin-offs created
through licensing, Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found that speciﬁc TTO policies such as inventor royalty rates and the
willingness to make equity investments were important. Lockett and Wright (2005) added TTO business development
capabilities as a further factor. The development of these capabilities depends on the experience and skill level of the TTO
staff (see Grimaldi et al. (2011) and the literature reviews by Rothameral et al. (2007), O'Shea et al. (2008), Bradley et al.
(2013) and Kochenkova et al., 2016).
On the other side, several studies identify problems with TTOs as intermediaries, which suggests additional infra-
structure and ﬁnancing may not spur entrepreneurship. Litan et al. (2007) suggest TTOs are misguided due to an over-
emphasis on revenue maximization and centralization. Kenney and Patton (2009) believe TTOs are ineffective due to
bureaucratic problems, informational limitations and misaligned incentives. Using survey data, Siegel et al. (2004) found
that 80% of managers and 70% of scientists at US research universities cited bureaucracy and inﬂexibility as barriers. Based
on European data, Clarysse et al. (2007) found TTOs play only a marginal, often indirect role, in spurring academics to start
new companies.
Although the results in the scholarly literature are mixed, the following hypothesis is based on what policymakers
expected:
H1. Infrastructure and ﬁnancing support provided through the Knowledge Creates Markets reform stimulated university
start-up companies
Beyond the infrastructure and ﬁnancing, the Knowledge Creates Markets reform included one of the most signiﬁcant
changes from both a legal and cultural perspective: the abolishment of Professor's Privilege. Professor's Privilege originated
from Article 5 of the German constitution that protects the freedom of science and research. The new program repealed
Clause 42 of the German employee invention law that had granted university researchers – as the only occupational group
in Germany - the privilege to retain the ownership rights to their inventions that otherwise rest with the employer.
During the Professor's Privilege era most of the responsibility for university technology transfer was in the hands of
German professors and patents played an important role.4 Patenting provided the legal means for negotiating and part-
nering with private ﬁrms to pursue development and commercialization, especially as most academic discoveries are early-
stage or “embryonic” (Colyvas et al., 2002; Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Through this process most German professors gave up
their IP to ﬁrms, but they also established relationships that involved the exchange of technology with some sort of
compensation (pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary). In other words, university-industry technology transfer in Germany had
evolved over time into a fairly extensive network of faculty-ﬁrm interactions. Presumably most of these relationships were
bilateral in the sense that the universities were not legal partners and did not receive any ﬁnancial compensation.
Also, by owning the patent rights, university researchers could leverage the advantages of patents for creating start-up
companies. Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) suggest patents have a “dual function.” Beyond knowledge protection, patents may be
an important device for reducing asymmetric information and signaling the “quality” of the venture and thus expected
returns of the business idea to potential lenders, which provides easier access to ﬁnance (Conti et al., 2013; Haeussler and
Colyvas, 2011; Graham et al., 2009; Audretsch et al., 2013). Similarly, Shane (2001) argues that patents are dis-
proportionately important to independent entrepreneurs who lack complementary assets. Clarysse et al. (2007) conﬁrm
that patents increase the initial funding that university start-ups raise. Levin et al. (1987) state, that “[…] for small, start-up
ventures, patents may be a relatively effective means of appropriating R&D returns, in part because some other means, such
as investment in complementary sales and service efforts may not be feasible. The patents held by a small, technologically
oriented ﬁrm may be its most marketable asset” (Levin et al., 1987, p. 797).5
In the current era without Professor's Privilege, German university researchers are required to cull their research ﬁndings
for inventions and report any inventions to the university – unless the researcher decides to keep his or her inventions
secret by not publishing or patenting. The university has four months to consider any submitted inventions for patenting. If
the university does not claim the invention, the rights to pursue patenting and commercialization are returned to the
researcher. If the university does claim the invention, the inventor receives at least 30% of the revenues from successful
commercialization, but nothing otherwise. Furthermore, the university handles the patenting process and pays all related
expenses such as processing fees, translation costs and legal expenses. University researchers retain the right to disclose the4 University patents are one mechanism for transferring academic research results to the market. Other mechanisms include collaborative and contract
research, licensing, networking, publications and so forth (Grimaldi et al., 2011).
5 A comprehensive investigation of the various expected beneﬁts of patents for technology foundations is conducted by Graham and Sichelman (2008)
and Graham et al. (2009). They conclude that protection against imitation and easier access to ﬁnance are the main reasons for start-ups to patent (Graham
et al., 2009). Other functions of patents of almost an equal importance include an improved likelihood and value of an IPO or acquisition, a stronger
reputation, a better negotiation position with other companies, the prevention of IP suits and licensing revenues (Graham et al., 2009).
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with third parties also remained valid during a prescribed transition period.
The abolishment of Professor's Privilege created a complex situation regarding the incentives to form start-up compa-
nies. It took the initial patenting and commercialization decisions away from the researchers and gave them to the uni-
versities. The researcher became secondary to the university TTO in the search, negotiation, partnering with private ﬁrms,
and forming start-ups. Individual researchers, however, remained the primary decision makers regarding the formation of
start-up companies. The critical issue is how the loss of patent rights changed the researchers’ costs and beneﬁts associated
with the decision to found a start-up company.6
University ownership of the patent rights could strengthen the relationship between patents and the formation of start-
ups if, for patented technologies, university ownership lowered “entry” costs for starting a company and/or increased
expected returns. This seems to be the outcome German policymakers had in mind. They argued that academic researchers
were so resource constrained that the costs of patenting and the market uncertainty surrounding the potential value of
discoveries were limiting commercialization. Prior to the reform most patents on university-discovered inventions were
owned by private ﬁrms. Researchers gave up their patent rights to industry partners as part of a quid-pro-quo, but this meant
they lost the opportunity to form start-up companies based on those discoveries. With the university as the primary patent
owner, a researcher could regain patent rights if the university does not claim the invention or if the university decides to
license the discovery back to the researcher, making it easier for faculty members to found new companies.7 Moreover, the
university TTOs and regional PVAs perform various kinds of services such as market value assessment before patenting
(Debackere and Veugelers, 2005). These services may increase the expected return on a discovery by decreasing the
uncertainty about its potential value and thereby stimulate more start-up companies.
H2. The relationship between university start-ups and university owned patents became stronger following the Knowledge
Creates Markets reform (i.e. increased the marginal effect of patents on the number of start-ups).
Even if the strength of the relationship between patents and start-ups increased, the effect on the total number of start-
ups depends indirectly on the level of patenting in the post-reform era. Prior work has found the Knowledge Creates
Markets reform decreased the volume of patents in university-discovered inventions (Czarnitzki et al., 2015; Von Proff et al.,
2012). This effect was primarily due to heterogeneity among university researchers in the costs of patenting, which was
reﬂected in the patent ownership distribution. For instance, under Professor's Privilege, academic researchers who main-
tained a well-functioning network with industry partners had relatively low costs of patenting by assigning the IPRs directly
to industrial partners, but had to forego starting a company on those inventions. After the reform, patenting costs increased
as the new university-ownership of the IP disrupted the existing ties between academic inventors and industry (Czarnitzki
et al., 2015), but start-ups became a new possibility. Those academic researchers without industry partners had relatively
high patenting costs before the reform. Afterward, both the costs of patenting and the costs of starting a company may be
lower for these researchers. Overall, the impact of the reform on the formation of researcher start-ups will reﬂect these two
effects.8
H3. The net effect of the Knowledge Creates Markets reform on the number of start-ups is determined indirectly by the
change in the volume of patents.3. Empirical model and data
3.1. Identiﬁcation strategy and estimation approach
The Knowledge Creates Markets reform provides a unique opportunity to analyze how policy initiatives inﬂuence aca-
demic entrepreneurship. The changes in technology transfer support and the new IP ownership rules outlined above were
targeted primarily at university-discovered inventions. To identify the policy effects, we use a difference-in-difference (DiD)
research design with university inventors as the treatment group and PRO researchers as the control group. Like university
professors, PRO researchers conduct academic research at publicly funded institutions in Germany. They work in similar6 This only applies to start-ups that are based on patented technologies. For those that do not rely on patents, the abolishment of Professor's Privilege is
irrelevant and any effect of the reform on non-patent start-ups is captured in hypothesis #1.
7 Hellmann (2007) found this will happen in cases where the researcher is more efﬁcient than the TTO at searching for an industry partner. In his
model, a spin-off is an alternative mechanism for organizing the search for an industry partner.
8 Three recent studies use a different framework than we present above, but suggest the net impact of the reform will be fewer spin-offs. Damsgaard
and Thursby (2013) consider both regimes using a theoretical model that incorporates the need for continued inventor effort in development. They found
the university ownership leads to less entrepreneurship if established ﬁrms have some advantage in commercialization. Kenney and Patton (2011)
compared inventor versus university ownership using data on technology-based spin-offs from six universities. The University of Waterloo, which was the
only university with inventor ownership, matched University of Wisconsin Madison and exceeded the other US universities even though it had less
research and development support and fewer faculty members. The authors point to ineffective incentives, information asymmetries, and contradictory
goals as the primary reasons university ownership produces fewer spin-offs. Hvide and Jones (2016) found a 50% decline in faculty start-ups and patenting
after the abolishment of Professor's Privilege in Norway.
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unlike university professors, PRO institutions already had a strong technology transfer infrastructure and the patent rights
to the inventions by PRO researchers were always owned by the institution. Our researcher-level DiD setup accounts for
common macroeconomic trends and individual-speciﬁc unobserved effects that capture an academic inventor's “taste” for
patenting and entrepreneurship.
Academic entrepreneurship is measured as the number of ﬁrm foundations by academic inventors per year. Note that we
deliberately label the dependent variable as start-ups as we will measure all ﬁrm foundations by academic inventors in the
empirical study and not only those that went through the university (or PRO) TTOs, which are commonly labeled as spin-
offs.
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The direct impact of the reform is captured by the coefﬁcient β1 of the interaction term ðProf ∙NewPolicyÞ. Prof is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the inventor is a university professor and 0 when the inventor is a PRO
researcher. NewPolicyt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 following the policy change, 2002 onward, and
0 otherwise. We use a three year moving average of past research publications, ð3yrAvgPubsÞi;t1, to capture the arrival of
new knowledge. δi is a researcher-level ﬁxed effect and γt is a full set of annual time dummy variables.
9 Note that the
professor dummy variable gets absorbed into the researcher ﬁxed effects. Similarly, the new policy dummy variable gets
absorbed by the annual time dummy variables.
In addition to the direct impact of the reform, we are interested in how the abolishment of Professor's Privilege changed
the relationship between university start-ups and patents on university-discovered inventions (hypothesis #2). To test this,
we include the variable PAT and its interaction with ðProf ∙NewPolicyÞ. As the coefﬁcient on PAT shows the strength of the
relationship before the reform, a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on ðProf ∙NewPolicy∙PATÞ would indicate the relationship
became stronger.
Notice that Eq. (1) includes summation operators over the index j on the explanatory variable PAT. This index captures
ownership types for patented academic inventions. We classiﬁed patents on university and PRO-discovered inventions into
three ownership types (J¼3): industry, employer institution (university/PRO), and personal (i.e. held by the individual). This
was accomplished by manually reviewing the list of applicants and coding the records. Also note, for notational simplicity,
we are using the variable PAT to represent patent counts and citation-weighted patents. As will be clear in the discussion of
the results, we use citation-weighted patents in some speciﬁcations.10
In the results section, we present two versions of Eq. (1) in separate tables. First, we look at the overall effect indicated by
aggregating all patents and ignoring the variation by ownership type. This will test whether the relationship between start-
ups and patents became stronger overall. In a separate set of regressions, we implement a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation that
estimates separate coefﬁcients for employer-owned (e.g. university) and personal-owned patents in the post-reform period.
This allows us to investigate whether the strength of the relationship increased for these ownership types.
Intuitively one might expect that the start-up equation (Eq. (1)) would be modeled as a binary choice. However, a few
researchers are involved in multiple ﬁrm foundations in some years. Therefore the variable startup becomes a count variable
and not a dummy variable. Consequently, we estimate Eq. (1) using a ﬁxed effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator (QMLE). As a member of the linear exponential family of distributions, the Poisson QMLE produces consistent
estimates of the population parameters as long as the conditional mean is correctly speciﬁed (Gouriéroux et al., 1984;
Wooldridge, 1999). Consequently, the function f is chosen to be the exponential function in the Poisson regression. We use
robust standard errors clustered at the researcher-level. As a robustness test, we also estimate conditional ﬁxed effects logit
regressions where the link function is logistic instead of exponential.
It is possible that the number of patents is endogenous in the ﬁrm foundation equation. For instance, unobserved market
opportunities could inﬂuence the decision to found a new ﬁrm and be correlated with the decision to seek patent pro-
tection. We would like an instrumental variable that inﬂuences patent protection, but is unrelated to the market oppor-
tunities facing the academic founder. Aggregate patent trends in the United States (US) are attractive instruments because
they are arguably exogenous to the ﬁrm foundation decision by German academic entrepreneurs, but correlated through
broader technology trends. We decided to use the growth rate of US patents by technology class. Higher growth in US
patents within a technology area indicates the technology area is increasingly crowded. As more patents crowd a given
technology space, costs of patenting exogenously increase. As long as the growth in US patents within technology areas is
not related to the error term in the start-up equation for German professors, the IV is exogenous.9 Note that the literature on life cycle models of researcher productivity often includes career age of the researchers and the square of career age in
regression speciﬁcations (Diamond, 1986; Levin and Stephan, 1991; Turner and Mairesse, 2005; Hall et al. 2007). As we estimate ﬁxed effects regressions,
the model would be fully saturated with the ﬁxed effects, the full set of time dummies and career age. Thus, we do not include the variables career age and
its square as regressors; career age is included implicitly by the time dummies in combination with the ﬁxed effects.
10 We weight patents by the number of citations received over a four year window following application. To avoid dropping patents with zero citations,
the citation-weighted patents are constructed as (patentsþcitations).
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instrument was constructed using the 35 technology ﬁelds according to the Fraunhofer technology classiﬁcation and linked
to each researcher according to his/her main ﬁeld of activity. The growth rate was deﬁned over the past three years as:
[(USPAT(t)–USPAT(t3))/USPAT(t3)]. For the ﬁrst-stage regression, which is a linear model with ﬁxed effects, the F-
statistic on the growth of US patents was 13.86, p-value o0.001. In the second-stage explaining start-ups, the residuals
were insigniﬁcant with a z-statistic of 0.25 and a p-value¼0.803. Based on these results, we do not consider patent as
endogenous in our subsequent models.11
As outlined in Section 2, the overall effect of the policy on entrepreneurship also depends on how the reform inﬂuenced
the volume of patents on university-discovered inventions. To investigate this indirect impact, we follow prior work by
Czarnitzki et al. (2015) and use a DiD setup for the volume of academic patents. These DiD models take the form
E PATijt
 ¼ g β0þβ1 Prof i UNew Policyt
 þβ2ð3yr Avg PubsÞi;t1þβ3zi;t1þδiþγt
  ð2Þ
where the notation is as above in Eq. (1) and z stands for the vector of instrumental variables as described above.
As patent counts take only nonnegative integer values, we use the ﬁxed effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator (QMLE) again, i.e. the function g is chosen to be the exponential function. We use robust standard errors clustered
at the researcher-level.
3.2. Data and descriptive statistics
The relevant population of researchers includes academic inventors all who are afﬁliated with a university or PRO and
appeared as an inventor on at least one patent submitted to the German or European Patent Ofﬁces between 1978 and 2008.
Academic inventors are a subpopulation of all academic researchers in Germany. The broader population includes academic
researchers who only published. The core of the Knowledge Creates Markets reform, however, was the abolishment of
Professor's Privilege and this did not impact researchers who never participated in the intellectual property system over the
entire time period.12
We constructed a researcher-level panel dataset of academic inventors following a multistep procedure. In addition, we
searched for all of these inventors in the “Mannheim Enterprise Panel,” a database containing all German ﬁrm foundations
and detailed information on the founding persons. The data compilation is summarized in Appendix A. This process yielded
a sample with 17,417 university and 35,353 PRO researcher-year observations.13 We deﬁned the study period to extend from
1995 through 2008 so that we observed enough time periods before and after the policy change. For each inventor, our data
contain the individual's history of patenting between 1978 and 2008 and the individual's history of publications between
1990 and 2008. Each researcher enters the panel when we observe either the ﬁrst patent application or the ﬁrst publication.
The researcher stays in the panel for a maximum of 35 career years after which we assume the researcher retires. To account
for earlier exit, we adopted a 5-year rule that has a researcher leaving the panel if he or she had no patenting or publishing
activity for ﬁve consecutive years. The estimation sample contains 52,770 researcher-year observations corresponding to
1946 different university researchers and 4551 PRO researchers.14
In total, the sample contains 1030 start-ups that were founded between 1995 and 2008 by the researchers in the sample.
Thus, most of the 52,770 researcher-year observations in the sample have a value of zero (98.4%). In some cases, researchers
formed more than one start-up in a given year. In the sample, we have 674 observations (1.3%) where a single start-up was
founded by a researcher in a given year; 127 cases (0.2%) where two start-ups were formed, and in about 0.05% of the cases
more than two start-ups were formed (with the maximum being ﬁve).15
Table 1 gives the ﬁrst indication of how the policy reform inﬂuenced academic start-ups and patenting. It shows the
number of researcher-founded start-ups, university-discovered and PRO-discovered patented inventions before and after
the reform. Looking at the third column, the number of start-ups decreased for university and for PRO researchers after the
reform. This is the opposite of what policymakers expected and casts doubt on hypothesis #1. Column four shows the
average annual number of patents decreased for both university discoveries and PRO discoveries. However, the patenting
activity of university researchers fell much more dramatically following the reform. This suggests that the abolishment of
Professor's Privilege did not stimulate university patenting, however, the strength of the relationship between patenting and
start-ups may have increased. This will be investigated in the subsequent econometric models.11 Note that we experimented also with speciﬁcations where we additionally used patent applications at the Japanese Patent Ofﬁce (JPO) as instru-
mental variables in addition to the US variable. However, these speciﬁcations did not improve or change any result.
12 As noted by a referee, the population of academic researchers who patent is not representative of all academic researchers. The policy reform may
have had indirect effects that are not fully captured with our data. One should keep this limitation in mind when interpreting the results.
13 This sample excludes those researchers who were employed at both a PRO and university, as it is not clear which patent regime applied to these
researchers. Furthermore, we had to drop persons with very common German names to ensure clean matches across the patent, publication and ﬁrm
foundation databases. See Appendix A for more details.
14 Note that our sample is smaller than the one used by Czarnitzki et al. (2015). This is because we had to drop some common inventor names when
linking the inventors to the ﬁrm foundation data.
15 We checked the right tail of the distribution manually and the data are correct. Some exceptional researchers apparently build a small portfolio of
different start-up companies at a certain point in their careers.
Table 1
Academic entrepreneurship and patents before and after the 2002 policy reform (annual mean values, 1995–2008).
Start-ups per year Patents per year
University researcher Before 2002 46.43 755.86
After 2002 42.57 397.43
PRO researcher Before 2002 29.43 1230.00
After 2002 28.71 1132.43
Note: The sample of patenting university researchers comprises 1946 different inventors and the sample of PRO researchers amounts to 4551 people. The
1946 university researchers were, on average, involved in about 46 start-ups and 1312 patents per year before 2002 and these numbers dropped to about
43 start-ups and 1177 patents per year after the law change. The numbers for PRO researchers read equivalently.
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on university start-ups will depend in part on how the ownership distribution on patented university discoveries changed.
For instance, when private ﬁrms hold the patent rights, researchers have limited opportunities to use these inventions for
start-up companies (e.g. industry ﬁrms are unlikely to support new companies that may be competitors in their technology
space).
Table 2 shows the average number of patents on university-discovered inventions by ownership type before and after the
reform. In line prior results reported in Czarnitzki et al. (2015), we see the overall decrease in patented university inventions.
Before the policy change, the university inventors ﬁled on average 0.58 patents per researcher per year, and this number
drops to 0.34 patents after the policy change (see bottom row labeled “total” in Table 2). For the pre-reform period, the ﬁrst
row shows the extent of faculty-ﬁrm bilateral interactions before the reform. Industry applicants owned an average of 0.45
patents per researcher per year. After the shift to university ownership, industry ownership was cut in half to 0.23 on
average. This decrease may reﬂect higher transaction costs after the reform as university TTOs interrupted these bilateral
relationships. Even at this much lower level, faculty-ﬁrm relationships still accounted for the majority of university-invented
patents after the policy change (62%). Personal-owned patents also fell from 0.14 to 0.04 per researcher per year after the
abolishment of Professor's Privilege. In contrast, university-owned patents increased from 0.02 to 0.10 per researcher per
year and accounted for 27% of all patents afterward. The econometric models will show how these ownership changes
affected university start-ups.
More detailed descriptive statistics of the sample employed in the following regressions are presented in Appendix B.4. Econometric results
Using the scientist-level DiD research design, we begin with a baseline evaluation of the Knowledge Creates Markets
reform. Table 3 shows the regression results explaining the number of university/PRO start-ups using ﬁxed effects Poisson
QMLE as well as conditional ﬁxed effects logit regressions. Models 1 and 2 use a count of total patents on academic dis-
coveries while models 3 and 4 use patents weighted by forward citations (a form of quality adjustment).
In the recent applied econometric literature, scholars have raised some doubts about the validity of standard errors in
common DiD regressions that estimate treatment effects of policy reforms. Typically relatively long panels are used and the
policy reform variable is just a dummy that switches from 0 to 1 for the treatment group and then remains at the value 1. As
this is a regressor that does not vary a lot across the sample observations, scholars have been concerned about biased
standard errors, particularly referring to the Moulton bias and to serial correlation problems (Moulton, 1990). Therefore, we
conducted a number of robustness tests where we follow the discussions in Bertrand et al. (2004) and Angrist and Pischke
(2009). First, we tested for autocorrelation by estimating a linear ﬁxed effects within regression model with ARTable 2
University-discovered patented inventions by applicant type before and after the 2002 policy reform (mean values, 1995–2008).
Before 2002 After 2002
Industry applicant 0.45 74% 0.23 62%
Personal applicant 0.14 23% 0.04 11%
University applicant 0.02 3% 0.10 27%
Sum 0.61 100% 0.37 100%
Total 0.58 0.34
Note: An applicant is equivalent to a US patent assignee. The total row is not the sum of the cells of the columns because some patents are co-applications
of different owner types (e.g. industry and personal). In these cases we counted the patent for all owners (instead of applying fractional counting) as each of
them maintains unrestricted disposal rights (unless contracts over-ruling the default rights are made). The control group of PRO researchers is omitted here
as the law change in 2002 did not apply to them. See the descriptive statistics in Appendix B for more information.
Table 3
Regressions on academic entrepreneurship (aggregate patents).
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Start-ups Start-ups Start-ups Start-ups
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
QMLE Poisson ﬁxed effects regressions
ProfnNewPolicy 0.036 0.174 0.006 0.180 0.032 0.175 0.012 0.180
Patents 0.115nnn 0.03 0.123nnn 0.032
ProfnNewPolicynPatents 0.057 0.066
Patents-cited 0.042nnn 0.012 0.045nnn 0.013
ProfnNewPolicynPatents-cited 0.025 0.029
Avg. Pubs 0.018 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.013
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared
(13))
51.82nnn 52.28nnn 51.73nnn 51.78nnn
Observations 6035 6035 6035 6035
Conditional ﬁxed effects logit regressions
ProfnNewPolicy 0.041 0.171 0.043 0.181 0.044 0.176 0.053 0.181
Patents 0.097nnn 0.030 0.098nnn 0.032
ProfnNewPolicynPatents 0.005 0.074
Patents-cited 0.033nn 0.013 0.035nn 0.014
ProfnNewPolicynPatents-cited 0.013 0.039
Avg. Pubs 0.024n 0.013 0.024n 0.013 0.025n 0.013 0.025n 0.014
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared
(13))
66.14nnn 52.41nnn 54.07nnn 58.48nnn
Observations 6035 6035 6035 6035
In the case of the Poisson regression, we use cluster-robust standard errors, and for the logit models, we computed cluster-bootstrapped standard errors
using 400 replications. Signiﬁcance:
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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test were always close to the value 2, indicating that no auto correlation is present. This is in line with our expectations as
start-up creation at the level of the individual researcher is an intermittent activity rather than a persistent one. Further-
more, we calculated cluster-bootstrapped standard errors using 400 bootstrap replications. These were always close to the
analytical cluster-robust standard errors. Because of space limitation, we do not show all these numbers. In what follows,
the results of the ﬁxed effects Poisson model using analytical cluster-robust standard errors are reported, and for the
conditional ﬁxed effects logit models bootstrapped standard errors are shown.
The difference-in-difference regressions in the context of treatment effects estimation are based on the assumption that
before the intervention the treatment and the control groups show similar trends in the dependent variable. See Appendix C
for a discussion of the common trend assumption. Statistical tests do not reject the hypothesis that the start-up variable
shows a common trend in the pre-treatment period for university researchers and PRO researchers.
Turning back to the results in Table 3, policymakers expected the reform to increase the number of start-ups by uni-
versity researchers due to infrastructure and ﬁnancing support as stated in hypothesis #1. Looking across all four models,
the variable (Prof*Newpolicy) is not statistically signiﬁcant in any model. The new PVAs and the additional support for
university TTOs did not produce an increase in the number of university researcher start-ups above PRO researcher start-
ups. In fact, from the descriptive statistics in the last section, we saw that start-ups among both groups declined following
the reform.
Regarding the abolishment of Professor's Privilege, hypothesis #2 stated that university ownership could have
strengthened the relationship between patents on university-discovered inventions and university start-ups. At least in
principle, with university ownership, more patented university-discoveries could be available for start-ups and value-added
services by the TTOs could increase the expected returns to forming a start-up. For the models in Table 3, the variables
patents and patents-cited capture the marginal effect of patented university discoveries before the Knowledge Creates
Markets reform. In all four models (and across both estimation methods), the effect is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level
indicating a strong relationship between patents and start-ups. Looking at Model 1, the marginal effect suggests an addi-
tional patent leads to about a 12% [exp(.115)1] increase in the number of university start-ups before the reform. For
citation weighted patents, the results in Model 3 are smaller in magnitude, about a 4.4% increase in start-ups, on average.
The marginal effects obtained from the conditional ﬁxed effects logit models are similar in size, yet slightly smaller. The
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in any model. Contrary to the prediction in hypothesis #2, this indicates that the strength of the relationship between
patents and start-ups did not get stronger following the reform.
In Table 4, we disaggregate patents into the three ownership types and re-evaluate how the reform changed the strength
of the relationship between patents on university-discovered inventions and university start-ups. Looking at the pre-reform
relationships in Models 1 and 3, the results are consistent with prior expectations. Patents owned by private ﬁrms are not
related to university start-ups. Patents held by the researchers’ employers (university or PRO) are related to start-ups. This
suggests that universities and PROs were somewhat successful at connecting patents to start-ups before the reform. Patents
held by the individual researchers (i.e. personal patents) are positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant. Each additional
personal patent in the pre-reform period is associated with about a 34% [exp(.291)1] increase in the number of start-ups
(for citation-weighted patents in Model 3 the marginal effect is about 10%).
But did the Knowledge Creates Markets reform increase the strength of the relationship between patents and start-up
activities? Based on the ﬁndings in Models 2 and 4, the answer is somewhat mixed. For simple patent counts, Model
2 shows that the reform increased the strength of the relationship for university-owned patents. The coefﬁcient is highly
signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the suggests each additional patent on university-discovered inventions increases the number
of researcher start-ups by about 29% [exp(.254)1], on average. When using citation-weighted patents, however, the
coefﬁcient on (Prof*NewPolicy*Employer Patents-cited) is much smaller in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant. As can be
seen in the bottom panel of Table 4, the results for the conditional ﬁxed effects logit models are very similar. This casts someTable 4
Regressions on academic entrepreneurship (patent ownership type).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Covariates Start-ups Start-ups Start-ups Start-ups
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std.
Error
Coef. Std. Error
QMLE Poisson ﬁxed effects regressions
ProfnNewPolicy 0.026 0.174 0.054 0.176 0.052 0.176 0.072 0.178
Firm Patents 0.059 0.039 0.057 0.039
Employer Patents 0.086n 0.049 0.047 0.055
Personal Patents 0.285nnn 0.083 0.290nnn 0.089
Firm Patents-cited 0.008 0.018 0.006 0.018
Employer Patents-cited 0.051nn 0.022 0.041n 0.024
Personal Patents-cited 0.100nnn 0.036 0.098nn 0.039
ProfnNewPolicynEmployer Patents 0.254nn 0.105
ProfnNewPolicynPersonal Patents 0.067 0.203
ProfnNewPolicynEmployer Patents-cited 0.086 0.054
ProfnNewPolicynPersonal Patents-cited 0.045 0.089
Avg. Pubs 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.022 0.013
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared(13)) 55.24nnn 53.11nnn 53.16nnn 52.10nnn
Observations 6035 6035 6035 6035
Conditional ﬁxed effects logit regressions
ProfnNewPolicy 0.034 0.174 0.002 0.185 0.005 0.191 0.018 0.178
Firm Patents 0.026 0.041 0.025 0.038
Employer Patents 0.098nn 0.049 0.061 0.059
Personal Patents 0.291nnn 0.089 0.281nnn 0.098
Firm Patents-cited 0.011 0.021 0.013 0.021
Employer Patents-cited 0.062nn 0.026 0.054nn 0.027
Personal Patents-cited 0.096nnn 0.047 0.090n 0.048
ProfnNewPolicynEmployer Patents 0.266nn 0.125
ProfnNewPolicynPersonal Patents 0.105 0.243
ProfnNewPolicynEmployer Patents-cited 0.091 0.070
ProfnNewPolicyn Personal Patents-cited 0.060 0.148
Avg. Pubs 0.025 0.013 0.024 0.014 0.026 0.014 0.026 0.014
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared(13)) 59.77nnn 56.21nnn 65.93nnn 55.10nnn
Observations 6035 6035 6035 6035
In the case of the Poisson regression, we use cluster-robust standard errors, and for the logit models, we computed cluster-bootstrapped standard errors
using 400 replications. Signiﬁcance:
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
Table 5
Poisson models of academic patents (aggregated and by ownership type).
Dependent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Covariates overall patents ﬁrm patents personal patents employer patents
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
Coef. Std.
error
Dependent variable: patent counts
ProfnNewPolicy 0.153nn 0.078 0.754nnn 0.111 0.128 0.194 1.746nnn 0.135
Avg. Pubs 0.039nnn 0.009 0.036nn 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.054nnn 0.011
Growth US Patents 0.377nnn 0.122 0.229 0.171 0.751nnn 0.240 0.377nn 0.157
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared
(13))
161.74nnn 31.38nnn 136.53nnn 343.92nnn
Observations 52,770 24,312 9607 39,406
Dependent variable: 4-year forward citation-weighted patent counts
ProfnNewPolicy 0.153n 0.090 0.711nnn 0.122 0.017 0.233 1.685nnn 0.159
Avg. Pubs 0.029nnn 0.009 0.028n 0.015 0.002 0.009 0.052nnn 0.011
Growth US Patents 0.198 0.147 0.001 0.206 0.622nn 0.299 0.248 0.188
Test on joint signiﬁcance of time dummies (Chi-squared
(13))
Observations 52,770 24,312 9607 39,406
Cluster-robust standard errors. Signiﬁcance:
n po0.1.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
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intended to be a correction for the quality of the inventions under the idea that a “high quality” invention should attract
more follow-on patenting. While standard, this assumption about citation-weighting is quite strong and may actually be
correlated with different factors than the market value of the invention or its potential to earn private returns.
It is clear from the results in Tables 3 and 4 that patents on university-discoveries are strongly related to the number of
university start-ups, although one may question whether the reform strengthened this relationship. The net impact of the
reform on academic entrepreneurship, however, also depends on how the reform affected the volume of patents. To
investigate this we start by replicating the main result of Czarnitzki et al. (2015) using Eq. (2) and the smaller sample
available for this analysis. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates based on Poisson QMLE with cluster-robust standard
errors for patent counts as well as the citation-weighted patent counts. Looking at the upper panel, i.e. at the regressions
using patent counts, we ﬁnd that the overall treatment effect, which is revealed by the coefﬁcient on ðProf ∙NewPolicyÞ in
Model 1, is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This indicates that the overall effect of abolishing Professor's
Privilege was to decrease the volume of patents obtained on university-discovered inventions in Germany. It is economically
signiﬁcant as well. Holding the arrival of new knowledge and other exogenous trend factors constant, the coefﬁcient
estimate shows the volume of university patents decreased by about 14% [exp( .153)1], on average.
Models 2–4 in the upper panel of Table 5 rerun the regression speciﬁcation in Eq. (2) using the patents by ownership
type as alternative dependent variables. In Model 2, ﬁrm patents decrease dramatically after the shift to university own-
ership. The roughly 53% [exp( .754)1] decrease in the number of patents represents an economically signiﬁcant decline
in technology transfer through faculty-ﬁrm relationships. The decrease in personal patents is not signiﬁcant, but the
increase in employer patents due to the shift to university ownership is very large and signiﬁcant. The point estimate reveals
a 473% [exp(1.746)1] increase, albeit from a small starting base. The results suggest that we can expect a lower university
start-up rate after the policy change because patents have been shown to be essential for technology start-ups (Graham et
al., 2009). The regressions using citation-weighted patent counts in the lower panel of Table 5 show similar results.5. Conclusion
Following the US Bayh–Dole Act in 1980, university ownership became the leading intellectual property model for sti-
mulating university-industry technology transfer for many countries around the world including Germany. In 2001, Ger-
many introduced the Knowledge Creates Markets policy that not only set up new infrastructure and subsidies to support
technology transfer, but more fundamentally, it shifted the ownership rights of university-discovered inventions from
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expectation that increased patenting would allow more licensing and the formation of new start-up companies.
The German policy experiment provides a unique opportunity to learn how academic entrepreneurship responds to
policy changes, speciﬁcally to greater resources (i.e. infrastructure and subsidies) and to university ownership of IP rights. To
identify these effects, we use a difference-in-difference research design with the university researchers as the treatment
group and researchers at German public research organizations (PROs) as the control group. Unlike university researchers,
PRO researchers already had well established TTOs and the rights to their inventions were already owned by their
employing institutions.
The empirical analysis found no impact of the new infrastructure or its associated ﬁnancing on the number of university
start-ups. University start-ups followed the same trends as PRO start-ups after the policy: researchers in both groups of
institutions formed fewer start-up companies. Our analysis focuses on the six year period right after the policy change when
German TTOs where new at most universities and PVAs were completely new. Some might argue that these institutions
lacked the necessary capabilities and routines that are important for fostering academic entrepreneurship (Lockett and
Wright, 2005). However, recent studies, including an evaluation report of German PVAs, suggest inefﬁciencies may be a
better explanation for our ﬁnding (Cuntz et al., 2012). This is consistent with a growing literature suggesting that inter-
mediaries such as PVAs and TTOs are subject to numerous inefﬁciencies (e.g. Chapple et al., 2005; Markman et al., 2005;
Anderson et al., 2007; Siegel et al., 2004; Kenney and Patton, 2009; Hertzfeld et al., 2006).
We found that the strength of the relationship between patents and start-ups increased (i.e. the marginal effect of
patents on start-ups), but only for university-owned patents following the reform and not for citation-weighted patents. As
expected, ﬁrm-owned patents were not signiﬁcantly related to faculty start-ups, but personally-owned patent were strongly
related to start-ups in the pre-reform period. The post-reform coefﬁcient for personally-owned patents was insigniﬁcant,
which indicates the relationship did not change due to the policy. This evidence suggests university ownership increases the
dependence of academic entrepreneurship on patent protection, but the resulting incentive effects on faculty start-ups
remain mixed. On the one hand, patent protection confers advantages to new companies such as signally for ﬁnancing and
the ability to prevent imitation. In principle, this helps spur academic entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the time and
money required to obtain patent protection is costly and, at least for some technologies and markets, this may not be
necessary. In these cases, a requirement for patent protection could be a bureaucratic barrier that impedes academic
entrepreneurship. How these beneﬁts and costs balance out will depend on the speciﬁc circumstances facing the academic
entrepreneur.
But even if the relationship between patents and start-up activities got stronger, the impact on the number of start-ups
still depends on how the number of patents changed as a result of the policy. Consistent with prior work, we found sig-
niﬁcant decreases in the volume of ﬁrm-owned patents, an increase in the volume of university-owned patents, and no
change for personally-owned patents. This suggests a trade-off emerged in the modes of technology transfer due to the
abolishment of Professor's Privilege. Faculty-ﬁrm exchanges decreased dramatically and faculty start-ups increased to some
degree. By displacing so many faculty-ﬁrm relationships, our evidence suggests the Knowledge Creates Markets reform
likely decreased overall university technology transfer, although a ﬁnal conclusion will need to wait until more research is
completed.
For policymakers, our ﬁndings highlight the need for careful consideration of the institutional and cultural context before
implementing reforms on IP ownership. Too often, the university ownership model is assumed to be the most effective IP
policy for spurring academic entrepreneurship and/or other forms of technology transfer. It is important to remember that
the Bayh–Dole Act was negotiated to clarify IP ownership for non-governmental US institutions within the US cultural
environment. For Germany, in the era of Professor's Privilege, IP ownership rights were clearly delineated and privately held.
Our evidence suggests the network of faculty-ﬁrm relationships in place prior to the Knowledge Creates Markets reformwas
disrupted without compensating beneﬁts. It appears the value and extent of this network was poorly investigated at the
time of the reform. One clear lesson is for policymakers to require more background research and information before
adopting IP ownership reforms.
Our study is not free of limitations. It will be important in future research to examine the performance of university start-
up companies to better understand how these policies affected the economic impact of academic entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurial support and the ownership of patent rights might change the economic contribution of university start-ups
by altering the “quality” distribution of these new companies, which may be observable using ﬁrm sales or employment
data. Furthermore, our inferences about technology transfer are based on patents and start-ups. A more inclusive analysis
would add indicators such as licensing, contracting agreements, material transfers, and other less formal arrangements. For
this, researchers will need to develop new databases. Overall, these limitations point to new opportunities for research as
policymakers need information on how to structure IP ownership rules for greater innovation and growth.Acknowledgments
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demark Ofﬁce.Appendix A. Data collection procedure
Our data process starts with all patent applications ﬁled at the German Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (DPMA) and the
European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) involving at least one German inventor since 1978 using the PATSTAT database. We collapse
the list of relevant patent documents to the number of inventions to account for patent families. Between 1995 and 2008
(our sample period) the total number of patent families is 624,041. Based on our data process, German professors and PRO
researchers appear as inventors on 58,252 patent families (9.3% of all patent families). Among those, 18,253 refer to
professor-invented patent families.
Searching patents invented by university faculty
As no comprehensive list of German university faculty members exists, we followed an alternative strategy that has been
used in prior research to identify patents of university professors (see e.g. Czarnitzki et al. (2007, 2009)). In Germany, the
award of a doctorate and holding a professorial position are considered great honors. The “Dr.” becomes an ofﬁcial part of
one's name and is, for example, even mentioned in the national IDs and passports. The professor title is protected by the
German criminal code (article 132a) against misuse by unauthorized persons. Accordingly this title is used as a name afﬁx
not only in academic environment, but also in daily life. Based on this, we search the inventor records in the database for the
title “Prof. Dr.” and a large number of variations of this.16 After having obtained an initial list of patent documents, we also
searched for these inventors again in order to see whether they also patented without the “Prof. Dr.” title. Note that we do
not claim to have identiﬁed all university invented patents, but it is certainly a large share of this population. Our numbers
are close to those reported in policy documents circulated during the debate on Professor's Privilege in the late 1990s. Those
documents said that university-invented patents accounted for about 4% of all German invented patents. This is an inter-
mediate data preparation step. The list of patent documents will be disambiguated in a subsequent step to identify the
number of patenting professors.
Identifying patents by PRO researchers
The identiﬁcation of patents by PRO scientists is more straightforward because they can be searched by institution (i.e.
applicant) names. The intellectual property rights to inventions made by their researchers were always owned by the
institutional. We obtained a list of about 500 PRO institutes existing in Germany from the “Bundesbericht Forschung und
Innovation 2012” published by the federal government. These institutional were searched as applicants in the patent
documents. In order to create a list of unique PRO inventors, we select all patents on this list that have the PRO as only
applicant. These are 70% of all PRO patents. This was necessary to avoid including industry researchers is our data. Next we
searched for all patents by these inventors again, in order to come up with a comprehensive list of patents ﬁled by PRO
inventors.
Disambiguation routine
The two lists of retained patent documents were pooled. This merged list may include too many patents, because of
name homonyms. In addition, some inventors may switch between the two groups of institutions and thus appear in both
lists. Therefore, we then implemented a disambiguation routine leading to a list of unique inventors.
The disambiguation algorithm is based on a relation network analysis. Every node within this network is a patent
connected to other patents by layers of relations deﬁned by shared applicants, co-inventors, citations and joint sets of IPC
codes. The analysis uses a hierarchical approach by ﬁrst traversing connections of high reliability to deﬁne sub-clusters that
function as new nodes for the next iterative step. By aggregating information within these ‘hypernodes’ new connections
emerge that will also be traversed and so on. As every sub-cluster describes a part of an inventor career, suspiciously large
sub-clusters can easily be identiﬁed, rejected and re-traversed with more restrictive requirements for the connections. This
method implicitly solves the common name problem. The resulting list of unique individuals and their corresponding
patents has been checked manually to the largest extent possible.
Some of the professors also appear as PRO researchers at some point in time. We exclude those researchers associated
with both institutions from the regressions reported in the main body of the text. By doing so, we omit those researchers for
whom we do not know which IP policy is binding, the policy of the university or the policy of the PRO.16 One may be concerned that the Professor Doctor title is also given as an honorary title to individuals who are not employed at universities. While the
granting of honorary titles seems to be relatively rare, some of these highly qualiﬁed individuals may be labeled as professors in our data process. We
believe any misclassiﬁcation error would work against ﬁnding a signiﬁcant policy effect as these individuals are not affected by the policy change.
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The list of inventors is used to perform name searches in the Thomson Reuters Web of Science publication database,
1990–2008. We ﬁrst retrieve all publications from Web of Science that match with respect to the names in our inventor list
and have at least one German afﬁliation. This amounts to 572,936 publications. Second, we disambiguate these authors from
Web of Science using cross-referencing information on journals, coauthors, citations and afﬁliations. Out of the almost
600,000 possible publications, 296,320 are identiﬁed as being authored by the inventors in our sample from 1995 to 2008
(the publication data from 1990 to 1994 was only taken into account in order to improve the name disambiguation routine
and are not part of our ﬁnal sample).Compiling the panel database
The ﬁnal step of the database construction involves generating a panel of unique academic inventors that includes
information on their patents, citation-weighted patents and publications for each year. We count patents at the family level
to ensure that patents in different jurisdictions for the same invention are not counted more than once. The unit of
observation is a researcher-year. We restrict the regression sample period to run from 1995 through 2008. However, we
keep those researchers who patented before 1995 in the sample. This implies that a researcher does not need to have a
patent in the 1995 to 2008 period to be in the sample. We deﬁne entry into research as the year the researcher ﬁrst
appeared as an inventor on a patent or as an author on a journal publication. The ﬁnal database is an unbalanced panel.Adding the ﬁrm foundation data to the panel
In order to add ﬁrm foundation data to the panel we matched the names and associated cities of the researchers
(professors and PRO researchers) to the owners, founder and major stakeholders of ﬁrms located in Germany. We use the
Mannheim Enterprise panel database for this exercise. It is a panel data set of ﬁrms located in Germany. It is maintained at
ZEW in cooperation with Creditreform, the largest business information service in Germany. Creditreform sends its ﬁrm
data in six-month intervals to ZEW, where the data is cleaned and prepared as to panel database, the Mannheim Enterprise
Panel (“MUP”). The MUP enables the analysis of, for example, market entrances and exits (start-ups and shut-downs),
changes in numbers of economically active ﬁrms in speciﬁc sectors and regions, the development of ﬁrms over time or the
dynamics of job creation in ﬁrms. Among other information, it includes the names of all founders and other shareholders.
We use this information to match start-ups to our academic inventor data.
The match is based on name and associated cities of the researchers. We exclude those researchers that have matches in
the ﬁrm database based on their name, but not on city as we cannot be certain that they are involved in a ﬁrm or not. We
keep those with matches based on name and city and those for which no ﬁrm foundation entry is found. Note that this
essentially means that researchers with very common German names are dropped. This reduces the number of observations
in the database for this paper to 52,770 researcher-year observations (1995–2008) with 830 researcher-year observations
associated with one or more start-ups per year. The 52,770 researcher-year observations are based on 1946 different uni-
versity researchers and 4551 different PRO researchers.Appendix B. Regression descriptive statistics
The following tables present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression models for both university
researchers and PRO researchers before and after the policy change in 2002. The variable PAT denotes all patents. This is
subsequently split to the different ownership types, i.e. FIRM indicates ﬁrm ownership; EMPL stands for the employer of the
scientist owning the patent which could be either the university of the public research organization for the control group;
and PERS denotes patents that are owned by persons. The term CIT then denotes the patent counts weighted by citations
these patents received in the 4 years following the patent application.
The variable US_PAT denotes the total number of patent applications at the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce in the
technology ﬁeld of the corresponding researcher. We experimented with several speciﬁcations in the regression model and
ﬁnally do not use the level of US patents but their three-year growth rate, i.e. GR_US_PAT¼(US_PATt –US_PATt3)/
US_PATt3.
Table B1 is here.
Table B1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable University researchers
Before 2002 reform (N¼ 9180) After 2002 reform (N¼8237)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STARTUP 0.04 0.23 0 5.00 0.04 0.23 0 4.00
PAT 0.58 1.41 0 24.00 0.34 1.03 0 28.00
PAT_FIRM 0.45 1.34 0 24.00 0.23 0.96 0 28.00
PAT_EMPL 0.02 0.19 0 4.00 0.10 0.39 0 6.00
PAT_PERS 0.14 0.51 0 10.00 0.04 0.24 0 5.00
PAT_CIT 0.97 2.79 0 62.00 0.52 1.85 0 56.00
PAT_CIT_FIRM 0.76 2.65 0 62.00 0.36 1.74 0 56.00
PAT_CIT_EMPL 0.04 0.38 0 17.00 0.13 0.63 0 15.00
PAT_CIT_PERS 0.24 1.05 0 26.00 0.06 0.45 0 13.00
3 yr avg. pubs 2.38 4.87 0 67.33 3.22 6.22 0 73.33
GR_US_PAT 0.28 0.22 0.19 1.00 0.29 0.17 0.21 0.85
PRO researchers
Before 2002 reform (N¼15,507) After 2002 reform (N¼19,846)
STARTUP 0.01 0.14 0 4.00 0.01 0.12 0 4.00
PAT 0.56 1.27 0 29.00 0.40 1.07 0 26.00
PAT_FIRM 0.21 0.98 0 29.00 0.16 0.90 0 26.00
PAT_EMPL 0.39 0.91 0 16.00 0.28 0.71 0 17.00
PAT_PERS 0.02 0.21 0 9.00 0.01 0.09 0 4.00
PAT_CIT 0.97 2.58 0 61.00 0.62 1.91 0 51.00
PAT_CIT_FIRM 0.37 1.96 0 61.00 0.26 1.58 0 51.00
PAT_CIT_EMPL 0.67 1.85 0 42.00 0.43 1.32 0 28.00
PAT_CIT_PERS 0.05 0.48 0 22.00 0.01 0.16 0 11.00
3 yr avg. pubs 0.87 2.11 0 44.00 1.12 2.46 0 63.67
GR_US_PAT 0.27 0.20 0.19 1.00 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.85
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Fig. C1 shows the pre-treatment and post-treatment trends of the start-up variable. Note that the depicted variables are
the averages of the within-demeaned dependent variable of the regressions presented in Tables 3 and 4. A visual inspection
may suggest that the pre-treatment trends in the period 1998/1999 differ between treatment and control group. Note,
however, the scale of the vertical axis: the numerical differences are tiny. When implementing a formal test on whether the
pre-treatment trends differ among the groups, the common trend assumption was never rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level. We implemented the test by annual t-tests on signiﬁcant differences in the change of start-ups in ﬁrst differences, and3 0.-
20. -
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0
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30 .
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Fig. C1. Average trends of start-up activity.
D. Czarnitzki et al. / European Economic Review 86 (2016) 131–146 145also conducted a joint test in a regression on ﬁrst differences of the start-up variable. The F-statistic on the test whether the
annual slopes are jointly different only amounts to F¼0.99 with a p-value of 0.43.References
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